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Abstract
We explore the impact of the self-serving bias on the supply and demand for re-
distribution. We present results from an experiment in which participants decide on
redistribution after performing a real effort task. Dependent on individual performance,
participants are divided into two groups, successful and unsuccessful. Participants’ suc-
cess is exogenously determined, because they are randomly assigned to either a hard
or easy task. However, because participants are not told which task they were assigned
to, there is ambiguity as to whether success or failure should be attributed to internal
or external factors. Participants take two redistribution decisions. First, they choose a
supply of redistribution in a situation where no personal interests are at stake. Second,
they choose a redistributive system behind a veil of ignorance. Our results confirm and
expand previous findings on the self-serving bias: successful participants are more likely
to attribute their success to their effort rather than luck, and they opt for less redis-
tribution. Unsuccessful participants tend to attribute their failure to external factors
and opt for more redistribution. We demonstrate that the self-serving bias contributes
to a polarization of the views on redistribution.
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21 Introduction
Political polarization has been recognized as a challenge for finding political consensus on
social and economic issues. Keefer & Knack (2002) argue that polarization increases legal
uncertainty and thereby hinders growth. Alt & Lassen (2006) provide evidence for higher
variations in political business cycles in politically more polarized countries. Other studies
have concluded that polarization reduces the likelihood to obtain broad consensus for policy
changes and increase collective decision-making costs (Alesina & Drazen (1991), Rodrik
(1999)). What makes societies polarized? Sunstein (2011) emphasizes the role of groups in
unifying their members’ views with respect to a shared political agenda, which results in
stronger polarization across groups. In this article we provide evidence that the experience
of success and failure contributes to the polarization in political views.
Our work focuses at a particular domain of social consensus, namely the degree of redis-
tribution between rich and poor members of the society. The recent resurgence of inequalities
in democratic countries has led to a renewed interest in the questions of redistribution.1 A
great body of research has sought to understand the factors driving the demand and the sup-
ply of redistribution.2 Both empirical (Alesina & Angeletos 2005) and experimental works
(Frohlich et al. 1987) have documented the heterogeneity of preferences regarding redistri-
bution. Our research goes one step further, showing that views on redistributive systems
are not only shaped by individual preferences, but also malleable by economic experience.
In an experimental setting we demonstrate that having been successful in a real effort task
makes participants less likely to redistribute income between two other participants, and
less likely to opt for redistributive systems behind a veil of ignorance. Unlike studies using
eliciting views about redistribution in field settings we can randomly assign participants to
the success and failure condition.
Our analysis builds on previous works on the self-serving bias (SSB hereafter). Theories
about the SSB postulate that individuals show a tendency to attribute their failure to situ-
ational factors, and their success to their own dispositions.3 In other words, the SSB claims
that, when an individual succeeds at a task, she tends to congratulate herself for her efforts,
while she is more prompt to blame the situation when she fails. The SSB predicts therefore
a tight relationship between wealth and the perception of the causes of poverty: wealthier
individuals are more likely to believe that they deserve their wealth. Considering the above
discussion, this might have two effects on the political market. First, the self-serving bias
may affect voters whenever they believe that they are successful in life: because people are
not willing to recognize that their success is due to random events, they are more likely to
support low tax rates. Second, the SSB might also be at play on the supply side of the po-
litical market: when deciding on redistribution, politicians are also influenced by their own
1Various recent works have documented this phenomenon (World: Atkinson (2003), Piketty & Saez
(2006); US: Piketty & Saez (2003); Germany: Dustmann et al. (2009)).
2The literature has investigated egoistic concerns Corneo & Gru¨ner (2002), Milanovic (2000), altruistic
motivations Fong (2001), Boarini & Le Clainche (2009), social considerations and future perspectives Keely
& Tan (2008).
3Miller & Ross (1975) describe the SSB as “[. . . ] people indulge both in self-protective attributions under
conditions of failure and in self-enhancing attributions under conditions of success”. See also Mezulis et al.
(2004) for a recent meta study. For applications in the economic literature see e.g. Babcock et al. (1995), or
Babcock & Loewenstein (1997).
3experience, and, thus, exposed to the SSB. In this work, we investigate both dimensions of
redistribution. On the one hand, we explore how participants are affected by the SSB when
they decide redistribution for other individuals, having no personal interests at stake (supply
side). On the other hand, we analyze how participants’ preferences toward redistribution are
modified by the SSB when they must decide for a redistribution rule that will affect their
unknown future own payoffs (demand side).
In accordance with the literature on the SSB we find that succeeding or failing in a task
gives rise to systematically different attributions and subsequent redistribution decisions.
These findings suggest that increased inequality might have a particularly strong impact on
polarizing views about redistribution. Rich people do not only oppose redistribution because
they expect to be net payers, but also because the SSB systematically shifts their fairness
principles. Likewise, poor people favor redistributive taxation not only because they expect
financial gains, but also because the SSB leads them to shift the blame for their situation to
external factors. Taken together this makes it difficult to reach a consensus and is likely to
increase political tensions across different strata of the society.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss previous experiments
on redistribution and the veil of ignorance. Section 3 describes the experiment and the
predictions. In Section 4 we present the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
An early contribution to the experimental literature on redistribution is Frohlich et al. (1987),
who investigate the choice of redistributive systems behind a veil of ignorance4, focusing on
the democratic process, where participants discuss the options until they reach an unani-
mous decision. They find support for a redistribution scheme that maximizes the average
income with a floor constraint. Later work focuses on individual choices for redistributive
systems and documents heterogeneity in redistributive preferences. Some studies argue that
redistribution is mainly determined by self-interest (Hoffman & Spitzer (1985), Durante et al.
(2014), Ubeda (2014), Rodriguez-Lara & Moreno-Garrido (2012)), while other stress the role
of social preferences (Tyran & Sausgruber (2006),Ackert et al. (2007), Schildberg-Hoerisch
(2010), Balafoutas et al. (2013)). Klor & Shayo (2010) study the effect of group identity
on redistribution and show that subjects tend to opt for redistribution which favors their
group. Eisenkopf et al. (2013) analyze redistribution in a setting of unequal opportunities
and find preferences for redistribution to be similar as in a setting where only risk affects
the outcome. Gerber et al. (2013) conduct an experiment where they vary the ‘thickness’
of the veil of ignorance. Participants either (i) know nothing, (ii) have a noisy signal about
their productivity, or (iii) have full information about their productivity. They show that
the level of redistribution is decreasing in the level of information.
While these studies typically measure preferences for redistribution before the realization
4The experimental literature has made an extensive use of the veil of ignorance to analyze the preferences
for redistribution net of selfish interests. The political economy literature has distinguished between two
versions of the veil of ignorance. According to Rawls, individuals should ignore everything they now about
their position, whereas Buchanan’s version of the veil requires only uncertainty about future outcomes (see
e.g. Voigt (2015) for an overview.)
4of income, Frohlich & Oppenheimer (1990), Cabrales et al. (2012), Cappelen et al. (2007), and
Großer & Reuben (2013) investigate preferences for redistribution contingent on economic
experience. Close to our work is Kataria & Montinari (2012), who report results from an
unequal opportunity treatment, where participants earn a payoff which partly depends on
luck and partly on effort. After the realization of profit participants votes on tax rates. In
our design we combine the two approaches: we start with the realization of economic profits
and measure the effect of redistribution choices affecting only the allocation of the profits of
future economic activities. Furthermore, as opposed to the previous literature we choose a
design in which there is a high degree of ambiguity as to the causes of success or failure.
All the papers discussed so far focus on the choices of subjects who are directly affected
by the redistributive transfers. In contrast, Konow (2000) studies the behavior of subjects
who are not directly affected by the redistribution. He shows that these ‘disinterested dic-
tators’ act according to the accountability principle, i.e. they are more likely to reward
individuals based on their efforts, and to compensate them for back luck. Our design al-
lows to investigate redistributive preferences in situations where the subject is not directly
involved (supply of redistribution), and when the subject is directly affected (demand for
redistribution). The distinctive feature which distinguishes our experimental design from
the previous literature is that instead of measuring preferences for redistribution we exoge-
nously manipulate the participants’ experience of success or failure and measure the effect
on redistributive preferences.
3 The Experiment
Our experiment explores the potential consequences of the self-serving bias on redistribution.
Our protocol aims at generating a self-serving bias among participants, and capturing the
effects of this bias on both the supply of and the demand for redistribution.
3.1 Design
The experiment started with subjects earning money in a real effort task. The purpose of
this task was to allocate the status of either ‘overachiever’ (to the subjects with an above
median performance among the subjects in a session), or ‘underachiever’ (to the remaining
subjects). This stage was followed by a manipulation check. After that we elicited our
two main measures of interest. First, subjects played the Disinterested Dictator Game
(DGG), providing us with a measure of supply of redistribution. Second, we conducted
the Redistribution System Game (RSG) as a measure for the demand for redistribution.
All interaction was anonymous and computerized. We used z-tree (Fischbacher 2007) to
program the interface, and ORSEE (Greiner 2015) for recruitment.5
Real Effort Task. The real effort task consisted of a simple task of counting the ones
in lines of binary digits. The screen contained 20 to 25 lines, with four to thirteen digits
each. Subjects had to indicate the number of ones occurring in each line. There were five
5See online appendix E for the instructions and screen shots.
5consecutive screens and there was a time limit of 25 seconds per screen. Correct answers
were rewarded by a certain number of tokens, depending on the condition they were assigned
to. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to the hard condition, the other half to the
easy condition. The maximum number of tokens was identical in both conditions. However,
the tasks were designed such that it was very unlikely that a subject in the hard condition
would earn more tokens than a subject in the easy condition. After completion of the five
screens we used the number of tokens earned in the real effort task to perform a median split
of the subjects within a session. Subjects who earned more tokens than the median were
told that they performed above median (in the article we label them as overachievers), the
other subjects were told that they performed below median (underachievers). The fact that
the difficulty of the two tasks was sufficiently different ensured that the allocation of the task
determined whether a participant was an over- or underachiever. Any differences between
over- and underachievers in the DDG or the RSG must then be caused by the allocation of
the task, and not by self selection of subjects into treatment.6
Subjects were aware of the procedures. In the instructions we informed them that they
could be assigned either to an easy or to a hard task with equal probability. Participants
were also told that the maximum possible earnings were the same in both tasks. However,
at no point in the experiment participants were told which task they were assigned to.
While the two tasks clearly differed in difficulty, even the easy task was designed such that
none of the participants managed to solve it perfectly, given the time limit. In addition,
participants could not observe other participants’ tasks. Consequently, participants were
unable to deduce which task they were actually assigned to.
After the completion of the real effort task, participants were informed whether their per-
formance was above or below the median. This information was followed by a manipulation
check. Subjects answered six questions as to which extent they believed that their relative
achievement (success or failure) was due the following factors: (i) the task’s difficulty (Diff ),
(ii) the introduction of the exercise (Intr), (iii) the clearness of the exercise (Clear), (iv)
their effort (Eff ), (v) their will (Will), and (vi) their attention and focus (Focus). The first
three questions identify situational factor, the last three questions individual factors.
Disinterested Dictator Game. For the DDG two participants (the ‘targets’) were ran-
domly selected among all participants of the session.7 The remaining participants (the ‘dis-
interested dictators’) were informed about the difference between the two targets’ incomes
of the real effort task. The disinterested dictators had then the possibility to redistribute
tokens from the wealthier to the poorer target. All participants were told that the decision
of one disinterested dictator would be randomly selected and implemented. Participants
6In the two first sessions (standard sessions hereafter) four subjects in hard condition managed to
become overachievers. Results from these sessions might be influenced by selection. In the results section
we will show that our results remain the same if we exclude these two sessions. For the remaining sessions
we increased the difference in the difficulty between hard and easy, and we observed a perfect separation.
We will refer to the latter as gap-sessions. For a comparison of the two versions see online appendix C.
7In order to ensure comparability among our sessions, the selection process was set as follows. First, we
randomly selected the first target. Second, we computed the difference of tokens between the first target
and the remaining participants. We then selected a participant such as to have a difference of tokens equal
to twenty (or, if there was no exact match, as close to twenty as possible).
6were also explicitly told that redistribution would concern only the two targets, and that
all others would not be affected by any redistribution mechanism in this task.8 Prior to
the decision, disinterested dictators were reminded that targets may have faced different
tasks. After every disinterested dictator made her choice, one redistribution proposal was
randomly selected, and implemented. Disinterested dictators received their payoff from the
real effort task, while targets received their real effort task payoff corrected for redistribution.
Finally the participants were informed about their final payoff. Importantly, the information
participants receive did not allow to infer any redistribution decision of other dictators.
We refer to this game as the Disinterested Dictator Game, because the dictator has the
power to redistribute, but–different from the dictator game–does not have his own profit
at stake. The game is also different from the so-called third party dictator game (Fehr &
Fischbacher (2004)), in which the classic dictator game is enriched by a third party who can
punish the dictator. A game similar to ours is presented by Konow (2000), who studies the
accountability principle. Konow investigates the redistribution choice of a dictator who is ei-
ther exterior to the real effort task and has no stake in the redistribution, or who participates
to the game and has direct stakes in the redistribution. Konow refers to the two treatments
as the Benevolent Dictator Treatment and the Standard Dictator Treatment. In our case,
dictators have taken part in the real effort task but have no stake in redistribution. Previous
works in the literature, such as Durante et al. (2014), also used disinterested decision-makers
to investigate redistribution decisions net of selfish interests.
Redistribution System Game. For the RSG participants were given new instructions.
In these instructions, participants were told that they were going to be matched into groups
of four, and that they were going to perform another series of real effort tasks that were
substantially different from what they did in the beginning of the experiment. Participants
were also informed that they were going to earn tokens in these real effort tasks, but that
their payoffs would also be affected by random shocks, which could be either payoff increasing
or payoff decreasing. Finally, the instructions said that, after each task and after each shock,
redistribution was going to occur within each group according to the group’s redistribution
system.
Participants were also informed that, prior to the real effort game, they would vote on
redistribution systems. We presented three canonical redistribution systems to the par-
ticipants. The libertarian system leaves each participant with her after-shock payoff (no
redistribution). The egalitarian system sums up all individual after-shock payoffs within the
group, and redistributes the sum in equal shares to the group members (full redistribution).
Finally, the social-liberal system sums up all individual after-shock payoffs within the group,
and redistributes the sum proportionally to the individual pre-shock payoffs (effort-based
redistribution). Subjects could indicate their preferences for the three systems in the vote,
i.e., apart from the ‘pure’ systems, they could also implement a mixture of the systems. To
aid understanding the instructions contained a table showing how each redistribution system
affects their final payoffs for given pre-shock and after-shock payoffs. Before turning to the
vote, we presented the participants with control questions to ensure that the three redistri-
bution principles were well understood. In four of the six sessions the control questions were
8Figure E1 in the appendix shows a screen shot of this stage.
7three general statements about the redistribution systems and participants had to indicate
whether they were correct or not (baseline sessions, for the instructions see Appendix E2).
In these sessions there are two sources of ambiguity: participants do not know the task they
will have to perform and they receive no specific information about the random shock. In
the two remaining sessions we eliminated the ambiguity about the random shock and in-
formed the participants that the shock would change their income by −5,−4, . . . , 4, 5 tokens
with equal probability (extended sessions, instructions in Appendix E3). Furthermore
we implemented different control questions, in which participants were asked to compute
hypothetical after-redistribution payoffs for a given set of pre-redistribution payoffs of the
four group members. The examples comprised four redistribution systems: 100% libertar-
ian, 100% egalitarian, 100% social-liberal, and 50% libertarian 50% social-liberal (Appendix
Figure E2).9
After the presentation of the redistribution systems, participants were asked to assign
weights wi between 0 and 10 to each of the three redistribution systems. Participants were
told that one group member’s set of choices would be randomly chosen and implemented
for the group. Given three weights w1, w2 and w3 we computed a triplet of relative weights
vi =
wi
w1+w2+w3
, i = 1, 2, 3. For each of the real effort tasks a participant’s final payoff is equal
to v1% (resp. v2% and v3%) of the payoff that she would have earned under the canonical
system 1 (resp. 2 and 3).
After the vote and the determination of the redistribution system participants were in-
formed about the redistribution system selected for their group. A screen displayed the
composition in terms of percentages of the three canonical system. After that, participants
proceeded with the real effort tasks. They had to read a short text (approx 140 words) and
count the number of misspelled words. The individual (pre-shock and pre-redistribution)
profit of the task was equal to the 20 tokens minus four times the absolute difference be-
tween the reported number of mistakes and the real number of mistakes in the text. After
each real effort task participants learned their initial profit, their profit after the shock,
and their final profit (including redistribution). Then participants were asked (1) whether
they were satisfied with the implemented redistribution system, and (2) whether they felt
reinforced in their original choice. The experiment ended after four real effort tasks.
The RSG is inspired by the experiment reported in Frohlich & Oppenheimer (1990),
where subjects choose a redistribution system without knowing the nature of the task they
are about to perform. Once a redistribution system has been selected, subjects are given
a series of texts to correct (spelling mistakes). The choice of redistribution systems follows
Gerber et al. (2013).
3.2 Hypotheses
Our experimental protocol aimed at investigating how the self-serving bias may impact the
supply and the demand of redistribution. We create a situation in which participants are
aware of their relative status in the population, but have limited information about whether
they should attribute the outcome to luck or effort. The real effort task in the beginning
9Using control questions presumably enhances subjects’ understanding of the mechanisms, but it might
have the disadvantage that the experimenter has to pick specific actions of the game as examples, which
might influence subsequent behavior, see Roux & Tho¨ni (2015).
8of the experiment creates two kinds of participants: those who performed better than the
median participant (overachievers), and those who performed worse than the median par-
ticipant (underachievers). We hypothesize that this manipulation induces a self-serving bias
among participants: overachievers tend to attribute the outcome to their efforts, whereas
underachievers tend to attribute the outcome to bad luck. The Disinterested Dictator Game
measures the impact of this change of the perceptions of causality on the supply of redistribu-
tion towards third parties. Indeed, as Konow (2000) showed, people decide on redistribution
according to the accountability principle, i.e. they reward people proportionally to their
level of effort. By affecting the perception of the role played by effort in the final outcome,
we expect the self-serving bias to affect the supply of redistribution: overachievers (under-
achievers) will be more likely to believe that efforts (random factors) determine success, and
will therefore be less (more) likely to redistribute. Because decision-makers profits are not
affected by redistribution, our protocol allows us to isolate how the redistribution is changed
by the perception of the causes of success in the absence of selfish interests.10 Our prediction
with regard to the DDG is:
Prediction 1 Overachievers will redistribute less than underachievers.
In the Redistribution System Game participants are asked to express their preferences
over three redistribution systems. Unlike in the first game, participants’ redistribution deci-
sions at the beginning of the second game are designed to affect their own future (unknown)
payoff. The ex-ante choice about the redistribution systems ensures that participants express
their demand for redistribution behind a veil of ignorance, i.e., not knowing the nature of the
real effort task.11 Following the same argument as for prediction 1, if the self-serving bias
changes one’s perception of the determinants of success, overachievers should be more likely
to believe that their future payoffs will be determined by their efforts than underachievers,
and therefore express a lower demand for redistribution.
When taking a decision in the RSG game, participants presumably consider three factors
that affect their future revenue: their level of effort, their ability in the (unknown) task,
and the random shocks. The first factor is obviously endogenous, while the two latter are
exogenous. The two exogenous factors result in uncertainty and risk. First, participants
face uncertainty regarding the nature of the task they are about to perform. Second, they
face risk concerning the shocks that they know to happen after each task. The libertarian
system corresponds to a situation without insurance. On the opposite, the egalitarian system
insures against both risk and uncertainty: if an individual faces a task at which he/she is
very bad, he/she will receive transfers from other participants more capable at this task.
Moreover, in the egalitarian system, shocks are fully compensated. However, the egalitarian
system comes at a cost, because it generates incentives to free ride. The social-liberal system
stands in-between: it redistributes according to the pre-shock payoff, which is determined by
the participants’ abilities and effort, but not by the shocks. Consequently, the social-liberal
10Note that our experimental design minimizes the focus on the own profit at this stage. The only
information participants receive when deciding in the DDG is the difference between the two targets’ payoffs.
They have no information about absolute payoffs, not even their own payoff.
11Our protocol is close to Buchanan’s version of the veil of ignorance. (See footnote 4) We get rid of
immediate egoistic interests by putting uncertainty on future outcomes.
9system provides an insurance against risk, but not against uncertainty.
Due to the self-serving bias a successful participant is more likely to see the outcome
as resulting from his/her own effort than a less successful participant. The self-serving bias
is therefore likely to impact the demand for redistribution in cases where causation is not
clearly determined. Thus, the self-serving bias should increase the demand for insurance
against uncertainty for participants who performed relatively worse, because they expect
the nature of the task to play a predominant role in the determination of their payoff. On
the other hand, random shocks are clearly exogenous. The self-serving should therefore not
have an impact on the demand for insurance against risk.
Three predictions follow from this discussion. First, we expect overachievers to have a
stronger preference for social-liberalism than underachievers. Conversely, we anticipate that
underachievers will display a stronger demand for the egalitarian system.
Prediction 2A Overachievers will opt for less egalitarianism than underachievers.
Prediction 2B Overachievers will opt for more social-liberalism than underachievers.
In case of the libertarian system things are less clear. If the social-liberal system was
not available, then this system would most likely be more preferable to overachievers than
underachievers, for the reasons discussed above. However, when all three redistribution
systems are available, support for the libertarian system can only be explained if participants
prefer some of the risk to be uninsured, i.e., if they are to some extent risk seeking. We do
not see an a priori reason why the status of under- or overachiever should systematically
affect risk preferences. Our prediction is therefore
Prediction 2C Overachievers and underachievers will not systematically differ in their
support for libertarianism.
4 Results
We ran six sessions with 24 participants each. All sessions were run in Strasbourg (January
and February 2014, July 2015). The sessions lasted about 45 minutes, and participants
earned on average 13.66 euro. We present our results in the order in which they were
elicited, starting with real effort task, followed by the Disinterested Dictator Game and the
Redistribution System Game.
4.1 Real effort task
The experiment starts with a real effort task, in which subjects are asked to determine
the number of ones in binary sequences. This provides us with a measure for individual
performance. The left panel of Figure 1 shows the results of the real effort task. Subjects
randomly allocated to the hard task scored on average 19.4 tokens (sd: 4.02), while subjects
in the easy task scored 33.6 (sd: 5.25) tokens. Spikes in the figure are standard errors,
indicating that the difference between the hard and easy task is highly significant.
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Based on the performance measure we classify our subjects into overachievers (above
median performance), and underachievers. In four sessions the hard/easy task was perfectly
separating the population, i.e., all participants randomly allocated to the easy task turned
out to be overachievers, and vice versa. In the other sessions four participants with the hard
task managed to perform better than the median participant, and became overachiever.
Consequently, four participants with the easy task became underachiever. Note that our
protocol induced the same level of information for both underachievers and overachievers
regardless of their original task. It follows that participants were not able to deduce whether
they were assigned to the hard or the easy task, such that presumably only the labeling
as ‘above the median’ or ‘below the median’ affected their attributions. Consequently self-
serving bias (SSB) can occur irrespective of the original task a participant was assigned
to.
Before looking at the redistribution decisions, we perform a manipulation check to see
whether our protocol effectively induced a self-serving bias among participants. To do so,
we compare answers to the six questions as to whether subjects attribute their success (or
failure) to effort or luck. Comparing the average scores of overachievers and underachievers
shows that the former gave systematically higher scores to all questions (see Table 1 in
the appendix). To compare the relative weight of situational factors to the factors related
to effort (individual), we define a measure Fatalism as the ratio between the sum of the
scores for the three situational factors and the sum of the scores for the individual factors.
The middle panel of Figure 1 shows the results. We find a clear and significant difference
in Fatalism between the two groups: With a ratio of 1.30 underachievers put a higher
relative weight on situational factors than overachievers (0.94). The difference is significant at
p = .003 (two-sample t-test).12 To conclude, the experience of being an under- or overachiever
systematically affects the way participants attribute the outcome to internal and external
factors. While overachievers tend to emphasize their own contribution, underachievers tend
to focus on external factors, i.e., develop a more fatalist attitude. We see this as a clear
indication for a self-serving bias. In a next step we investigate whether the differences
between over- and underachievers affect redistribution decisions.
4.2 DDG: Supply of Redistribution
Recall that in the disinterested dictator game redistribution affects only targets’ payoffs.
Dictators were specifically told that no redistribution would affect their own payoff in this
game. Since we have some variation in the differences between the two targets’ profits
across sessions we calculate the percentage of the payoff difference to be redistributed form
the richer to the poorer target. Zero corresponds to leaving the incomes unchanged, while
reallocating 50 percent of the difference means that the two profits are equalized. Overall
we observe a redistribution of 37.4 percent; 17.4 percent of the subjects do not redistribute
at all, while 41.7 percent of the subjects implement a solution which equalized payoffs.
Prediction 1 links a person’s status after the real effort task to the supply of redistri-
bution. The right panel of Figure 1 shows the average redistribution percentage chosen
12The results are very similar if we consider only the gap sessions (1.21 vs. 0.90); and the difference
remains significant (p = .012).
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Figure 1: Left panel: Average number of tokens earned in the hard and easy real effort task.
Middle panel: Levels of Fatalism, defined as the ratio between external and internal factors,
for over- and underachievers. Right panel: Percentage redistributed in the disinterested
dictator game. Spikes show standard errors.
by underachievers and overachievers (RedSupply). The difference is substantial and signifi-
cant: Underachievers redistribute 43.9 percent while overachievers redistribute 30.9 percent
(p = .003, two-sample t test).13 In the online appendix we provide additional analyses to
check the robustness of our results on Fatalism and the redistribution decision. First, we
perform a permutation test (two-sided p = .001 and p = .001, see Figures B1 and B2 in
the online appendix); second we run OLS estimates controlling for individual characteris-
tics gender, political orientation, age, and the practice of competitive sport, as well as a
dummy for the gap sessions (online appendix Table A1).14 The effect of overachiever is
highly significant in all specifications, while none of the other covariates seem to explain the
redistribution decision. This leads to our first result:
Result 1 Overachievers redistribute less money from the rich to the poor target than
underachievers.
4.3 RSG: Demand for redistribution
We now turn to the analysis of the preferences over the redistribution systems in the second
game. Because participants were told that the real effort tasks of the second game would be
substantially different from the first real effort task, they were a priori not able to predict
their productivity and their relative abilities and in the task. In this regard, the decisions
made at the beginning of the second game are taken behind a veil of ignorance. As opposed
13The effect size is almost identical if we consider only the gap sessions (42.2 percent vs. 29.9 percent);
and the difference remains significant (p = .015).
14Our results are also robust when we cluster standard errors on the session level. Because of the small
number of clusters, we implemented wild bootstrapping to obtain robust p-values such as suggest by Cameron
& Miller (2015). See model 5 in Table A2 of the online appendix for the results.
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Figure 2: Results from the Redistribution System Game. Bars show average relative weight
given to the respective redistribution system. Spikes show standard errors.
to the DDG, redistribution now affects the own payoff, which means that decisions can be
interpreted as demand for redistribution.
The choice of a redistribution system is measured by the importance levels indicated
for each of the three canonical systems. For the following analysis we normalize the scores
such that the value represents a percentage.15 Overall the social-liberal system (SocialLib)
is clearly the most popular among our participants, with an average relative weight of 46.3
percent, followed by the egalitarian system (Egal, 28.7 percent), and the libertarian system
(Libert, 25.0 percent).16
Regarding our predictions we find that overachievers’ preferences over redistribution sys-
tems are systematically different from those of underachievers. Figure 2 illustrates the main
results. Most pronounced are differences in the support for the egalitarian system, which
receives on average 36.6 percent of the relative weight among underachievers and only 20.9
among overachievers (p < .001, two-sample t test). Most of the difference is offset by a
stronger support for social-liberalism, which is more popular among overachievers (53.0 per-
cent), than among underachievers (39.5 percent, p < .001). For the libertarian we find
slightly more support among overachievers (26.1 percent) than among underachievers (23.9
percent). The difference is, however, far from significant (p = .585).17
We ran a series of OLS estimations to explain support for the redistributive systems by
a participant’s status and controls (for details see online appendix A, Tables A3 to A5).
15Results with the absolute weights are very similar (see Table 1). Absolute weights are labelled absLibert,
absSocialLib, and absEgal.
16The results from the two sessions with the extended protocol are similar to the results of the four
sessions in baseline. The weight of SocialLib is almost identical (46.5 percent vs. 45.8 percent , p = .878);
Libert receives somewhat stronger support in the baseline sessions (29.7 percent vs. 22.6 percent, p = .085).
For details see online appendix D.
17The results for the comparison between over- and underachievers are very similar in baseline and
extended. For example, the support for SocialLib increases from 40.0 percent to 52.9 percent in baseline
and from 38.4 percent to 53.3 percent in extended. See online appendix D for details.
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Across a number of specifications we confirm the main result that overachievers opt for
more SocialLib and less Egal, and there is no significant effect for Libert. Furthermore, male
participants tend to exhibit stronger (weaker) preferences for SocialLib (Egal) than female
participants. Among the remaining controls we find that political orientation is strongly
related to the support for Libert and Egal. Participants who indicate that they are politically
closer to the right opt for more Libert and less Egal.18 In the estimates with controls we find
that the sessions where we provided more information about the shock (extended) tends
to increase the support for Libert and decrease the support for Egal.
Taken together the evidence clearly supports our predictions 2A to 2C: The self-serving
bias affects the demand of insurance against uncertainty, but not the demand of insurance
against risk. Underachievers are more likely to prefer full insurance than overachievers
(egalitarianism), while overachievers display a stronger preference for a system that insures
only against risk.
Result 2 Overachievers have a stronger preference for the social-liberal system than under-
achievers, who, in turn, have a stronger preference for egalitarianism. We find no significant
differences in the support for the libertarian system.
5 Conclusion
Our paper investigates the consequences of the self-serving bias on redistribution choices. To
do so, we run an experiment in which we induce a self-serving bias among participants. To
isolate the effects of the self-serving bias from selfish interests, we make participants choose
on the level of redistribution in a disinterested manner or behind a veil of ignorance. This
allows us to assess the impact of the self-serving bias on both the supply and the demand of
redistribution.
We conclude on two far-reaching results. We show that participants with a good (resp.
bad) relative success status display a lower (higher) supply of redistribution, because they
are on average more (less) likely to believe that their outcome result from their efforts
compared to participants with a bad (good) relative success status. Second, we show that
the self-serving bias also affects the demand of redistribution in the same manner, i.e., by
reducing (resp. increasing) the demand for redistribution for relatively successful (resp. less
successful) participants.
Our findings have significant implications for political debates on redistribution, as the
self-serving bias polarizes both the supply and the demand of redistribution. The increase
in polarization resulting from the self-serving bias rises numerous questions. First of all, it
asks a normative question: Is the increased polarization of the political debate necessary
18In the instructions and on the screen we used the same labels for the three systems as in this article.
We cannot therefore rule out the possibility that the preferences for the libertarian system by the rightist
participants are driven by a (to them) appealing label. However, given the random assignment of the
easy and hard task, political orientation should be identically distributed across groups (overachievers vs.
underachievers). Indeed we observe no significant difference between the two groups (two-sample t-test:
p = .595). It follows that the lack of significance of the overachiever status cannot be attributed to labelling
issues.
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harmful for society? Previous works in the literature presented in the introduction tend
to indicate that political polarization has negative effects on economic growth. One could,
however, also postulate that the increased polarization might strengthen the competition
on the political market by forcing parties to propose different platforms. Even considering
that the heterogeneity of preferences is not necessary harmful for the system, it is however
legitimate to wonder whether the increase of polarization resulting from the self-serving bias
is welfare enhancing. This increase of polarization seems indeed to result from partly con-
tingent economic experience. In other words, the self-serving bias might generate volatile
variations in the political preferences toward redistribution. Although society might bene-
fit from divergence of opinions, collective decision-making may suffer from such variations.
Third, considering that the self-serving bias might create unnecessary polarization, a le-
gitimate question is whether institutions should seek to unbias citizens. The literature on
nudges argues that society might benefit from making use of psychological mechanisms as
policy tools (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). Two questions follow. First, is it legitimate for the
government to unbias citizens regarding redistribution, given that the government has its
own –maybe also biased– view about redistribution? Second, what is the unbiased amount
of redistribution one individual would have wanted if she did not experience her economic
condition?
Our experimental approach to induce a SSB with regard to success and failure could be
expanded to study a number of interesting questions. First, our protocol aimed at induc-
ing a self-serving bias among participants by creating two groups of individuals: over- and
underachievers. The dichotomous nature of our treatment is an experimental simplification,
which is not realistic. Expanding the design to a continuous setting would allow to investi-
gate how the SSB and redistributive choices would react to fine-grained changes in relative
performance. Second, it would be interesting to explore the potential of information to un-
bias the participants and reduce the polarization. One of the least controversial means to
unbias individuals might be to disseminate scientific evidence about the relative importance
of external and internal factors in the determination of the position in the social hierarchy,
such as the degree of intergenerational mobility (Bowles & Gintis 2002, Chetty et al. 2014).
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6 Appendix: Summary statistics
Variable Source All Participants Underachievers Overachievers p-value
Diff MC 3.903 3.597 4.208 0.052
(1.893) (1.998) (1.744)
Intr MC 4.604 4.472 4.736 0.412
(1.922) (2.143) (1.678)
Clear MC 3.639 2.125 5.153 0.000
(2.295) (1.695) (1.758)
Eff MC 3.951 3.333 4.569 0.000
(1.682) (1.601) (1.537)
Will MC 4.042 2.653 5.431 0.000
(2.099) (1.567) (1.582)
Focus MC 4.993 3.917 6.069 0.000
(1.83) (1.782) (1.105)
Fatalism MC 1.116 1.297 .936 0.003
(.74) (.942) (.387)
RedSupply DDG .374 .439 .309 0.003
(.25) (.246) (.24)
absLibert RSG 4.035 3.861 4.208 0.559
(3.545) (3.562) (3.544)
absSocialLib RSG 7.021 6.431 7.611 0.026
(3.194) (3.223) (3.074)
absEgal RSG 4.556 5.681 3.431 0.000
(3.747) (3.626) (3.544)
Libert RSG .25 .239 .261 0.584
(.232) (.238) (.226)
SocialLib RSG .463 .395 .53 0.001
(.248) (.201) (.272)
Egal RSG .287 .366 .209 0.000
(.255) (.261) (.226)
Table 1: Summary Statistics: mean and standard deviation (in parentheses); p-values cor-
respond to bilateral two-group mean-comparison tests. MC stands for Manipulation Check,
DDG for Disinterested Dictator Game and RSG for Redistribution System Game.
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